Descartes' ideal of consciousness is the supposed experience of aneternal "God" who is beyond space and time. For this "God", there is nodispersal in time or space and so no integrating is necessary. Allsides of an object would then be given together.
But this is precisely NOT our experience of "perception." Descartes' "God" does not "perceive" an object. Similarly, if every note of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony were "heard" simultaneous, it would not be the hearing of a symphony. The attempt to understand consciousness as analogous to a "God's eye view" is therefore doomed to failure.
Happily, the reduction protects phenomenologist's from thisattempt, for we describe our consciousness of an object as it isexperienced, not as it would be experienced by some idealconsciousness to which we have no access.
Because consciousness is experienced as essentially temporaland spatial, it can grasp an object only by an active process ofintegrating unities, of holding an object together as self-identical throughout its dispersed phases. Thinking ofconsciousness on the model of "God" blinds us to this active process,since for "God" there could be no dispersal; objects are alwaysalready prefabricated. Hence Descartes missed the essentiallyintentional nature of consciousness.
It goes without saying, of course, that this notion of "God" is the idea of an abstraction, not any actual God.